gists for decades. Over the years, a great deal of attention has been given to the factors involved in behaving morally (see, e.g., Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1991) . Many researchers, developmental psychologists in par ticular, also have continued to be interested in the nature of moral rea soning, usually in a Kohlbergian key (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984;  cf. Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988) . However, some (e.g., Walker & Pitts, 1998) (Clif ford, 1984) . Amazingly, in his 1911 edition of the influential Animal Intelligence (Thorndike, 1911) , Thorndike listed "intellect" and " char acter" as the major areas of inquiry for behavioristic psychology (Beatty, 1998) . In addition to writing seminal volumes in animal learn ing, educational psychology, and intelligence (Beatty, 1998) , Thorndike found (Thorndike, 1939) . In addition, he proposed the devel opment of a quantitative instrument for assessing morality that would be scaled similarly to measures of intelligence (Thorndike, 1940) .
Any discussion of psychologists who had abiding interests in the na ture of virtue, character, and moral goodness should include Hartshorne and May. Ironically, they are most remembered today for their major take-home message, which was that scores on global measures of moral attitudes and character had rather low validity for predicting people's actual moral behavior in real-life circumstances (e.g., Hartshorne, May, & Mailer, 1924) . That message was used as a strong argument by the "situationalists" in the 1960s and 1970s as they torpedoed the validity of self-report instruments. For their part, however, Hartshorne and May were far more charitable toward self-reports, and their annual reviews ot psychometric instruments for assessing individual differences (e.g., May, Hartshorne, & Welty, Jl27, 1928, 1L) (Durant, 1926 Robert Roberts' (1995) definition of virtues as "traits that fit us to live our life well in its dis tinctly human dimensions, and especially in its social ones" (p. 289 ).
As such, the virtues are at once conducive to the betterment of "me" and the "we" bringing happiness, productivity, and harmony to both the individual and the society more generally.
CHARACTER
The term "character" comes from a Greek root that is translated as "en graving." Aristotle referred to character as "the life of right conduct" (Lickona, 1991) . Thus, character refers to the enduring effects of life ex periences on the human psyche (Sperry, 1997) (Allport, 1921 (Allport, , 1927 (Nicholson, 1998) .
Exchanging the language of character for the language of personal ity, however, did not come without costs. As Nicholson (1998) and Cushman (1990) (Himmelfarb, 1996) (Gorsuch & Hao, 1993 ). Other survey data shows that over 90% of American teens and adults find that expressing gratitude makes them "extremely happy "or "somewhat happy" (Gallup, 1^98) . Obviously, descriptive data about the virtues gleaned from telephone surveys is not ideal; however, it does illustrate the abiding importance of such virtues in the consciousness of nonpsychologists. Learning to speak the language of virtues in developing approaches to assessment, education, and treatment could be a marvelous boon not only for basic psychological research, but also, for educational, school, clinical, coun seling, and consulting psychologists (see also Leonard, 1997 or not, our goal is that vou will find the articles a stimulating invitation back to considering some of the human traits that several decades ago found a home in scientific psy chology. Perhaps vou will agree that the virtues are important enough to be invited back home. And perhaps that "old" home, with its emphasis on the "bright side" of human existence, will be where the interface will live as we move into the 21st centurv.
